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Some properties are connected in a perspicuous and unproblematic way. For in-
stance, the possession of shape clearly entails the possession of size (and vice versa).
In other cases the connection is not so perspicuous. For instance, assuming that the
precise rest mass and negative charge of an electron are both among its fundamen-
tal intrinsic properties, what links them, given that those properties are inherently
separable? (eir separability is apparent from the fact that other kinds of particle
have the same mass as an electron but a dierent charge, or the same charge but a
dierent mass.) Given the inherent separability of those properties, what explains
their conjunction in this case? Oderberg (2007, 2011) calls this the “unity problem”,
and attempts to solve it have issued from assorted schools of thought within both
substance ontology and the metaphysics of natural kinds. One of the more signi-
cant of these solutions is proered by E.J. Lowe as part of his four-category ontology.
Here I explicate his solution, raise a possible objection, and suggest a reply.
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1. Introduction
Some properties are connected / conjoined / associated / tied together in a
manner that seems entirely clear and unproblematic. It is no mystery why
shape is associated with size, since shape entails size (and vice versa). Simi-
larly, it is clear that there is a necessary tie between being very annoying and
being annoying, or between being red and being coloured. (ough in each
of those three examples the precise nature of the necessary connection dif-
fers.) Inmany other cases though, the reason for a connection is not so clear.
Sometimes properties are associated despite a lack of any obvious necessary
link between them, or even despite being obviously inherently separable.
What accounts for the connection in cases like that?
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196 E.J. Lowe on the Unity Problem
Note that this question is most pressing when the inherently separable
properties under consideration are fundamental and intrinsic to whatever
object1 they are associated with—or in other words, when the properties
under consideration are what advocates of natural-kind essentialism sim-
ply call the essential properties of the object.2 To see why the question is
most pressing for such properties, consider by contrast the precise weight
and friendliness of a cat.ese are both accidental properties of a cat, prop-
erties that could change even while the cat remains a cat. It can gain a bit
of weight and still remain a cat, and it can acquire or lose a particular sort
of temperament and still remain a cat. Moreover it seems no great mystery
how this precise weight and temperament are conjoined in this cat, even
though they are inherently separable properties (such that the cat could gain
or lose someweight and retain its friendliness, or lose its friendlinesswithout
changingweight, and such that the sameweight could be found in a dierent
cat but absent the friendliness). is is because their presence is explained
by reference to more fundamental properties of the cat, and to past causal
processes in which it has been implicated. Its temperament for instance is
wholly explained in terms of certain underlying physiological properties and
past causal processes (assuming one is not a dualist with respect to cats), as is
its present precise weight.e conjunction of properties of that sort, of acci-
dental properties, is generally unproblematic despite their being inherently
separable, since their conjunction is explicable by reference to fundamental
properties and processes.
e question of howotherwise separable properties are conjoined is thus
most dicult, andmost interesting, when framedwith respect to a thing’s es-
sential properties. For instance, the cat is both alive and sentient. Assume for
the sake of argument (perhaps implausibly) that these are essential proper-
ties of the cat, irreducible to any more fundamental properties. Some things
are alive without being sentient (ex. mushrooms), and at least hypotheti-
cally some are sentient without being literally alive in the biological sense
(ex. angels, Cartesian egos). ese properties are essential to the cat, yet
are inherently separable. What then explains their conjunction? Or to shi
from a biological example to one from physics, consider the electron. For
any particular electron, onemight ask how its diverse seemingly fundamen-
tal intrinsic properties (its essential properties), including negative charge,
1 For the present I take ‘object’ here quite broadly to indicate any independently existent
entity, on whatever background substance ontology one subscribes to (including bundle
theory, according to which an independently existing trope or bundle of tropes might be
thought of as an object).
2 See (Gorman 2005) and (Williams and Charles 2013) for some recent accounts of essential
properties understood at least in part as fundamental intrinsic properties, properties whose
presence in an object is not explained by the object’s other properties.
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half-integral spin, and the precise rest mass of 9.109 × 10−28 grams, are co-
instantiated. Aer all, some of these properties lack any internally necessary
connection one to the other, qua property; this is apparent from the fact
that other particles have the same negative charge as an electron but a dier-
ent mass (tau leptons, for instance) while still others share the same mass as
an electron but are positively charged (positrons). And yet despite inherent
separability, an ability to be instantiated apart from one another, we nd cer-
tain properties conjoined. What accounts for that conjunction? Dumsday
(2010) refers to this as the ‘problem of complex essences’, while Oderberg
(2007, 2011) labels it the ‘unity problem’.3
Solutions to the unity problem have been put forward from a number of
dierent schools of thought within substance ontology and the metaphysics
of natural kinds. For instance, advocates of substratum theory argue that
it can be addressed by reference to the reality of substrata: multiple inher-
ently separable properties get linked by being instantiated in one and the
same substratum.4us the negative charge and precise rest mass of an elec-
tron are linked because, in the case of those objects we label ‘electrons’, those
properties happen to be co-instantiated in the same substratum. Or consider
bundle theory, the advocates of which have accounted for the unity prob-
lem in a number of ways: primitive compresence relations, mereological fu-
sion, co-location, etc. Or think of Scholastics like Oderberg (2007, 2011),
who address it by reference to a version of natural-kind essentialism linked
with a hylomorphic substance ontology. On this view, a kind-essence (or,
3 Note that this problem is distinct from the problem of what unies a composite object’s
constituent proper parts, insofar as the unity problem can apply even to fundamental ob-
jects (i.e., objects with no actual proper parts). It is worth noting though that some solu-
tions to the unity problem have also been thought applicable in some way to the compo-
sition issue; for example, historically many Scholastics have argued that substantial form
explains both property unication and unity of proper parts. And see (Scaltsas 1994, 61–77
and 150–154) for an argument to the eect that Aristotle himself took substantial form to
play both explanatory roles.
4 For an example of this see (LaBossiere 1994, 364): “It seems reasonable to accept that any-
thing which can aect or be aected must be real. Since the binding of tropes together
and the ordering of them to form complex entities clearly seem to be instances of aec-
tive activity, it seems reasonable to accept a real binder. . . . A bundle theorist can agree that
there are real beings involved in the binding of tropes while rejecting the claim that the real
binders are substrata. . . . In order to do this, the bundle theorist would argue that there are
binding tropes which serve to bind tropes together. . . . But, if each binding trope must be
bound by another binding trope an innite regress will arise and this regress creates two
serious problems. . . .” e two problems he alludes to are that (1) innite regresses of this
sort seem unable to provide an adequate causal explanation of any state of aairs, and (2)
that it is uneconomical to suppose an innite number of tropes underlying every single
instance of trope binding. At any rate, his basic idea is that substrata can do the necessary
unifying work and that a chief competitor, bundle theory, cannot.
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to use more traditional Scholastic terminology, a substantial form) is con-
ceived as an ontologically simple substance-universal whose instantiation
in / actualization of a primitive substantial potency (prime matter), entails
the characterization of that matter by a coherent set of essential properties.5
For instance the substantial form ‘electron’, the simple substance-universal
that constitutes the inner nature of this natural kind, entails by its instantia-
tion in prime matter the presence of negative charge, half-integral spin etc.6
According to Oderberg (2007, 142), just this sort of unifying kind-essence
/ substantial form, one that is ontologically prior to its associated essential
properties, must be posited in order to address the unity problem: “Some
philosophers. . . think that we can get by with talk of powers without hav-
ing to ground them ultimately in essence. Or, if they are partial to essences,
they would reduce them (without eliminating them) to collections of pow-
ers. . .Yet this takes us back to the unity problem. . . If to be a K just is to have
a collection of powers, then what unites the powers?” Oderberg here draws
attention to a distinction worth keeping in mind, a distinction between two
versions of natural-kind essentialism: what I will call ‘identity NKE’, accord-
ing to which a kind-essence is just a collection of properties, versus what
might be termed ‘priority NKE’, according to which a kind-essence is a uni-
versal that in some way entails or otherwise grounds a collection of proper-
ties. (As we’ll see, Lowe is a proponent of priority NKE, though a dierent
formulation of priority NKE than that advocated by Oderberg.)
All of those approaches (and still others I have notmentioned) have their
5 Consider for instanceKronen’s (1991, 130) summary of the hylomorphismof the prominent
early modern Scholastic, Francisco Suarez: “For Suarez, substantial form is dened as a
certain simple entity, substantial in nature. . .which in material substances determines the
matter of the substance to being such and such, where ‘matter’ is taken to refer to the primal
potential stu and subject of all material changes. It is likewise. . . that which gives rise to,
grounds, and unies, the various properties and accidents of the substance.”
6 As Connell (1966, 152), a contemporary Scholastic, puts it: “If an electron is an elementary
body, then its particular characteristics have their ground in the substantial form. . .which,
along with the primary matter, constitutes the electron’s substance. . . ” Given an under-
standing of essential properties as fundamental intrinsic properties, would this mean that
on the Scholastic view negative charge is not literally essential to the kind ‘electron’? Aer
all, charge is here proposed as being grounded in something more fundamental, the sub-
stantial form, and as we saw above, Gorman (2005) and others argue that part of being
an essential property is being ungrounded in more fundamental properties. In response I
would argue that the Scholastic view does allow for properties like negative charge to be
essential, even on Gorman’s formulation of ‘essential’. For on that formulation, a property
is essential when its presence is not explained by the presence of amore fundamental prop-
erty. And according to the Scholastic picture, the kind-essence / substantial form is not a
property (in the sense of a characteristic / mode / feature, which is what I take Gorman
to intend by ‘property’), but rather a substance-universal. So strictly speaking, there is no
conict in formulation here.
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strengths and weaknesses. One interesting and promising solution arises
out of the neo-Aristotelian four-category ontology advocated by E.J. Lowe.
While Lowe’s system has been subjected to a great deal of scrutiny in the
recent literature, not much attention has been paid to his treatment of the
unity problem. In the remainder of the paper I intend to rectify that. In the
next section I provide an explication of Lowe’s solution to the unity prob-
lem, along the way reviewing relevant portions of his four-category ontol-
ogy.en in section three I present a potential objection to his solution, and
in section four canvass a possible reply.at reply involves a reformulation
of part of Lowe’s system; however, I will make the case that it involves no
radical alteration of that system, remaining consistent with its core commit-
ments.
2. Lowe’s Solution to the Unity Problem
According to Lowe, the four fundamental7 ontological categories are those
of objects (individual substances like Tibbles the cat or Bob the particu-
lar electron), kinds (substance-universals like ‘felinity’ or ‘electron’), modes
(tropes / individual properties like the redness of Tibbles or the negative
charge of this particular electron), and attributes (property-universals like
‘redness’ or ‘negative charge’). Objects are characterized by modes, a ba-
sic internal relationship8 that is exactly mirrored at the level of universals,
such that kinds are characterized by attributes. us, just as the particular
electron is characterized by the mode that is negative charge, so the kind
‘electron’ is characterized by the attribute that is ‘negative charge’. Another
parallel relationship is that of instantiation between kinds and objects on the
one hand, and the instantiation relationship between attributes and modes
on the other; nally, objects exemplify attributes. is produces Lowe’s on-
tological square (Lowe 2006, 18):9
7 See for instance (Lowe 2013, 200): “. . . I regard these four as the fundamental ontolog-
ical categories, allowing that within each there may be various sub-categories, sub-sub-
categories, and so on.”
8 Lowe consciously prefers to use ‘relationship’ instead of ‘relation’ when discussing these;
see (Lowe 2006, 30) for the reasoning behind this preference.
9 Image used by permission of Oxford University Press.is OUPmaterial is view only and
does not comeunder aCreativeCommons license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/),
or any other open access licence, thatwould allow reusewithout requiring permission from
OUP.
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Kinds characterized by Attributes
instantiated by exemplied by instantiated by
Objects characterized by Modes
Objects have an ontological priority over and against theirmodes insofar
as modes are both existentially dependent on the objects to which they be-
long, and identity dependent on those objects.at is, the negative charge of
a particular electron could not possibly exist independently of that electron
(thus there are no free-oating tropes, contra some bundle theorists), and
furthermore the identity of that instance of negative charge presupposes the
identity of the particular electron it belongs to.10 Objects also have ontolog-
ical priority over the kinds they instantiate, since the kinds are existentially
dependent on the objects (i.e., there are no uninstantiated, Platonic univer-
sals), though in a slightly dierent way kinds are also prior to objects, insofar
as an object cannot exist without instantiating some kind.11 An object is it-
self an independently existent entity, logically dependent for its identity on
no other distinct object.12
Lowe’s ontology of substance can properly be classied as a version of
primitive substance theory. Advocates of this view deny that a substance is
constructed out ofmore basicmetaphysical constituents, whether properties
alone (as on bundle theory) or substratum + properties (as on substratum
theory) or prime matter + substantial form (as on hylomorphism). Instead,
10 For an argument in favour ofmodes having both types of dependence on objects, see (Lowe
1997, 37–40).
11 My thanks to an anonymous reader for stressing this symmetrical dependence in Lowe’s
picture of substance. It is worth pointing out that this symmetrical dependence between
object and kind is potentially problematic; prima facie, Lowe seems to posit mutual exis-
tential dependence between them, and of course that sort of mutual dependence is oen
seen as problematic (ex. the literature on circular causation). e problem arises pre-
cisely because Lowe sees objects and kinds as genuinely, irreducibly distinct, while also
arming moderate (Aristotelian) realism about universals rather than Platonic realism
about universals. If he were a Platonist, the circular dependence worry would evaporate,
since objects would depend on kinds but kinds would exist eternally and necessarily, inde-
pendently of objects. Space permitting I would be inclined to argue that Lowe’s system is
pushed in the direction of admitting uninstantiated universals (for this and other reasons),
though I know that would be quite a controversial line to take here.
12 See (Lowe 2009) for details on his independence account of substance. See also (Koslicki
2013) for a critical treatment of that account and its relation to competing denitions of
‘substance’.
Travis Dumsday 201
‘substance’ is a basic ontological category, and an individual substance is sim-
ply the instantiation of a substance-universal. A substance-universal is thus
not instantiated in or by anything else (like a substratum).13 It is worth em-
phasizing Lowe’s substance ontology, insofar as it plays a crucial role in his
solution to the unity problem. On his view in fact, the unity problem seems
not so much solved as dissolved, rendered inert by reference to his account
of modes as ways an individual substance is rather than as constituents out
of which a substance is constructed. Diverse inherently separablemodes, in-
cluding essential modes, are ‘connected’ or ‘tied together’ only in the sense
in which they are all characterizing one and the same object. Likewise, at
the level of kinds, diverse inherently separable attributes are linked insofar
as they are attributes of one and the same kind. Lowe (2006, 18):
e four-category ontology has no diculty in saying what ‘ties to-
gether’ the particular properties—that is, themodes—of an object. An
object’s modes are simply ‘particular ways it is’: they are characteris-
tics, or features, or aspects of the object, rather than constituents of
it. If properties were constituents of an object, they would need, no
doubt, to be tied together somehow, either very loosely by coexist-
ing in the same place at the same time, or more tightly by depend-
ing in some mysterious way either upon each other or upon some
still more mysterious ‘substratum’, conceived as a further constituent
of the object, distinct from any of its properties. It is precisely be-
cause a mode is a particular way this or that particular object is that
modes cannot ‘oat free’ or ‘migrate’ from one object to another—
circumstances that pure trope theorists seem obliged to countenance
as being at least metaphysically possible. Moreover, the four-category
ontology allows us to say that the properties of a kind [i.e., substance-
universal] are tied to it, in the laws towhich it is subject,14 in amanner
which entirely parallels, at the level of universals, the way in which an
individual object’s modes are tied to that object. In both cases, the
tie is simply a matter of the ‘characterization’ of a propertied entity by
its various properties and consists in the fact that the properties are
‘ways’ the propertied entity is.
13 For Lowe’s opposition to constituent substance ontologies see especially (Lowe 1998, 2000,
2012, 2013). Other proponents of primitive substance theory include Broackes (2006), Ellis
(2001, 2002), Homan and Rosenkrantz (1997), Loux (1974, 1978, 2002), and Macdonald
(2005).
14e reference to ‘laws’ here should not be misunderstood. For Lowe (2006, 29) “a law
simply consists—in the simplest sort of case—in some substantial universal or kind being
characterized by some non-substantial universal or property, or two or more kinds being
characterized by a relational universal.” Laws do not explain property unication, but con-
stitute instances of it. Laws thus reduce to facts about kinds. For more on Lowe’s ontology
of laws see especially (Lowe 1989, chapter8), (Lowe 2001), (Lowe 2006, chapter 8 and 9).
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e idea is that once one understands how objects are related to modes, the
unication of the latter, even when they are separable considered in abstrac-
tion from the object to which they do actually belong (think again of the
mass and charge of an electron) is rendered unproblematic. ey are just
diverse ways that some one object is, and ipso facto are unied.
Lowe thus sees the kind as a substance-universal that is not intrinsically
simple, but rather is complex in just the same way an individual substance is
complex, namely, complex in the sense of being characterized in diverse in-
herently separable ways. He sees it as an unproblematic complexity, insofar
as the manner in which an object is characterized by its modes is perspicu-
ous and so the parallel relationship between a kinds and its attributes is like-
wise perspicuous. Lowe’s solution diers here from the Scholastic picture
referenced above and advocated by Oderberg (2007, 2011). On that view,
the relevant substance-universal, or substantial form, is ontologically simple
and thus in need of no internal unication. It serves instead as the unier
of the diverse fundamental intrinsic properties associated with it, insofar as
its instantiation in prime matter entails the presence of those properties in
that prime matter. By contrast, on Lowe’s view, the kind is not ontologically
simple, but rather is complex in precisely the same sort of way that an indi-
vidual substance is complex, both being characterized diversely by dierent
attributes (for a kind) or modes (for an object).15 Still, both Lowe’s account
and Oderberg’s are versions of priority NKE, insofar as both views maintain
that a kind is something in some way distinct from and ontologically prior
to the attributes associated with that kind. Lowe (2006, 92–93) makes his
commitment to priorityNKE (and corresponding rejection of identityNKE)
quite explicit, writing that “in my view, a particular thing’s being an instance
15 At this point an anonymous reader asks: “Lowe’s kinds are ‘qualitatively complex’ because
of being characterized by distinct attributes. As does Oderberg, Lowe can claim that kinds
are mereologically simple and need no internal unication. So, in what exact sense can
Lowe’s kinds be claimed to be complex in contradistinction with the simple substance uni-
versals Oderberg introduces?” is allows for a helpful clarication: for both Lowe and
Oderberg, kinds / substantial forms certainly are mereologically simple in the sense that
they are not composed of proper parts. On that manner of simplicity, they are agreed.
However, for Lowe a kind is internally complex in the sense of being characterized bymul-
tiple attributes. By contrast, forOderberg a kind / substantial form is not literally character-
ized by any attributes. Rather, a substantial form is a simple, propertyless universal nature
whose instantiation primitively guarantees the possession of a certain range of modes by
the individual object. For Oderberg, the substantial form does not have attributes, though
the individual object instantiating the substantial form does have individual modes, and
has them precisely on account of the nature of the form. Space permitting it would be
protable to examine this contrast in greater detail, and the philosophical motivations for
Oderberg’s insistence on the simplicity of form. However, it would be somewhat tangential
to the present discussion.
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of a certain substantial universal can never be ‘reduced to’, or ‘analysed in
terms of ’, that thing’s being characterized by modes of certain properties.
It may indeed be the case that things of certain kinds necessarily exemplify
certain properties, but that does not imply that their being of those kinds
simply consists in their exemplifying certain properties.”16
At this point one might ask: how exactly does the object ground its es-
sential modes (and kinds their essential attributes)? Lowe has described this
relationship in terms of modes being ways an object is. Can anything more
be said here? Not much. As Lowe (2006, 27–28) writes:
But the properties do indeed need ‘support’, in the sense that they are
ontologically dependent entitieswhich can only exist as the properties
of that very individual substance. However, it is the individual sub-
stance itself which provides their ‘support’ in this entirely legitimate
sense, and this it can do without the spurious aid of some mysteri-
ous ‘substratum’.ere is no mystery as to how individual substances
can perform this ‘supporting’ role, for once we recognize the category
of individual substance as basic and irreducible and the category of
property-instance as correlative with it, we can see that their having
such a role is part of their essential nature. Explanation—even meta-
physical explanation—must reach bedrock somewhere, and this, ac-
cording to the four-category ontology, is one place where bedrock is
reached.e idea that some more fundamental explanation is some-
how available, if only we can probe reality more deeply is, I think, just
an illusion born of some of the confusions mentioned above.17
us the dependence / grounding relation between an object and its modes
is not capable of much further explication. Modes are entities whose exis-
tence and identity are essentially tied upwith that of the object to which they
belong, and objects are such as to be able to ground modes. What about the
object allows it to do this? Simply the nature of the object qua object.
Lowe takes it that the four-category ontology can address not only the
unity problem formulated above, but also what might be seen as a related
unity problem. at is, one might ask not only why inherently separable
essential modes are unied in some object, but also why it is that certain
sets of modes are found consistently co-instantiated across diverse distinct
objects. He argues that someone who denies the reality of kinds will have a
16 See also (Lowe 1989, 157): “. . . a point I take to be of immense importance is that simple
natural kind terms are no more denable in terms of lists or clusters of describable char-
acteristics or physical properties than proper names are equivalent to lists or clusters of
identifying descriptions.”
17 e confusions he talks about at the end there is chiey the confusion of taking modes to
be constituents of a substance rather than ways it is—that is what bundle theorists do, and
so they need a further explanation to explain what links them qua constituents.
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dicult time explaining this consistency across objects, while his ontology
makes this situation easily comprehensible (Lowe 2001, 22–23):
But recall that for someone of Martin’s persuasion these kinds of par-
ticle are not real: that is to say, there are no such substantial univer-
sals as electron and proton. ere are merely a great many individ-
ual particles with various combinations of powers, which we nd to
fall into certain families by virtue of the resemblances between their
powers.18 It turns out that a great many of these individual particles
have a certain combination of powers—including, say, unit negative
charge and a certain distinctive rest mass—and so all of these can be
denominated ‘electrons’. But we still lack a satisfactory explanation of
this situation, which is, prima facie, very remarkable and surprising.
Why is it that of all the possible combinations of powers in funda-
mental particles, only some combinations are found in nature? Why,
say, do we not nd a particle with the rest mass of the neutron but
the charge of the electron? (Again, never mind the scientic accuracy
of the example: I use it purely for illustrative purposes.) It seems to
me that only someone who takes laws of nature seriously, as involv-
ing universals, has an explanation for this state of aairs. We can say
that there are certain laws governing the domain of fundamental par-
ticles, such as the law that electrons carry unit negative charge and
the law that electrons possess a certain distinctive rest mass. Because
there are these and other laws concerning one and the same substan-
tial kind—the kind electron—there are individual objects instantiat-
ing that kind which exhibit a certain combination of powers and li-
abilities. Individual fundamental particles exhibiting other possible
combinations of powers are not found simply because there are no
substantial kinds, governed by appropriate laws,19 for any such par-
ticles to instantiate. . . . Someone who denies the reality of universals
and laws, other than as arising from resemblances amongst partic-
ulars, must, it seems to me, be prepared to accept the existence of
enormous and mysterious cosmic coincidences as a matter of brute,
inexplicable fact.
e four-category ontology can thus solve not only the unity problem that
is our chief concern here, but also a related unity problem having to do with
the consistent co-instantiation of modes across objects.
18 Here Lowe is referring to the nominalist metaphysics of C.B. Martin, according to which
there are only two fundamental ontological categories: objects and tropes.
19 I stress again that for Lowe, laws are reducible to facts about kinds. One must not take
this talk of ‘governance’ too literally in reference to his system. As he says a bit further on
(Lowe 2001, 23): “In short, my allegiance to an ontology including both substantial and
non-substantial universals, and the laws which consist in certain of the latter character-
izing certain of the former, is justied by an inference to best explanation of the order,
intelligibility and predictability of the physical universe.”
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Hopefully the preceding suces to convey the basic strategy Lowe em-
ploys in addressing the unity problem. In the next section explore a possible
critique of this strategy, an then in section four suggest a reply.
3. An Objection to Lowe’s Solution
Lowe arms that the object can and does, of itself, serve as unifying ground
of / support for its associated modes, and likewise, at the level of universals,
that the kind does the same for its attributes. But substratum theorists es-
pecially are liable to challenge this picture. us consider Martin’s (1980)
case for substrata. He argues that, of course, an object is an object-with-
properties20 and could not exist without properties. It is a unied whole,
and the properties are not to be thought of as literal constituents of the ob-
ject any more than the substratum is. An object is not literally constructed
out of properties + substratum (akin to a house being constructed out of
bricks and mortar). Rather, properties are modes of an object, that about
the object which makes it be a certain way; for instance the red trope is that
about the object which makes it red, which provides the truthmaker for the
true predication ‘that object is red’.21 As Martin (1980, 8) puts it: “It is, then,
an error to think of either the substratum of an object or the properties of an
object as parts of an object.ey are the non-object things about an object.”
And since an object is not simply a collection of properties,22 but rather bears
those properties, there likewise must be something about the object which
makes it a bearer-of-properties, which provides the truthmaker for the true
predication ‘that object is a property-bearer’. Substratum theorists reason
that the object itself, the object as a whole (i.e., the object qua propertied),
cannot be that truthmaker.e reason is that the object as a whole is prop-
ertied, and the propertied-object cannot account for the object’s bearing of
properties, since its status qua propertied is precisely what is calling out for
explanation. In other words, referencing the object as a whole, the object
qua propertied, as truthmaker for its bearing of properties (or grounding of
properties or support of properties), is circular. In fact, arguably that claim
(that the propertied substance accounts for its being a property-bearer) does
20 Note that Martin is a nominalist, so when I use ‘properties’ in referring to his account, I
mean tropes. However, his nominalism can be le to one side for present purposes.
21 Other prominent substratum theorists like Armstrong (1989, 97) are likewise ne with
talking about properties as modes. He brings this up in the context of an argument against
bundle theory: “My contention is that once properties and relations are thought of not as
things, but as ways, it is profoundly unnatural to think of these ways as oating free from
things. Ways, I am saying, are naturally construed only as ways actual things are or ways
actual things stand to each other.”
22 Indeed Martin takes bundle theorists to be fundamentally confused, mistaking the onto-
logical category of ‘proper part’ for the ontological category ‘property’.
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not even rise to the level of explanation, since nothing about the object has
been identied as the distinct truthmaker for its being a property-bearer.
Hence recourse must be made to substrata.
is is clearly a direct challenge to Lowe’s claim that the object’s nature
qua object suces as truthmaker for its grounding of properties. To this
challenge, Lowe and other primitive substance theorists might reply that an
object’s being a bearer of properties is just not the sort of fact that admits of
further explanation. To repeat a portion of Lowe (2006, 27–28) cited in the
previous section: “ere is no mystery as to how individual substances can
perform this ‘supporting’ role, for once we recognize the category of individ-
ual substance as basic and irreducible and the category of property-instance
as correlative with it, we can see that their having such a role is part of their
essential nature. Explanation—even metaphysical explanation—must reach
bedrock somewhere. . . .” In fact Lowe (2000, 513) replies directly to Martin’s
account: “But why suppose that the subject of inherence is anything other
than the very object whose qualities is ‘supports’? And why, indeed, sup-
pose that there is a genuine relation, one of ‘support’, between substratum
and quality?”23
To thatMartinmight in turn reply: even the primitive substance theorist
must him/herself think of the subject of inherence as other than the object-
as-a-whole (i.e., the object qua propertied), not only to avoid circularity in
explanation, but also because the primitive substance theorist believes that
the object has ontological priority over its modes. As we saw earlier, Lowe
arms that the latter depend on the former both for their existence and
their identity. In this way, primitive substance theorists are committed to
the idea that an object is a genuine reality genuinely distinct from its modes
(just as, at the level of the substance-universal, kinds are genuinely distinct
from their attributes). On this point, consider another advocate of primitive
substance theory, (Broackes 2006, 149), who writes: “Tibbles [the cat] has
properties. . . and he is distinct from his properties, in the sense that he is not
identical with any or all of them. . .But that does not imply that Tibbles and
his properties are separable, in the sense that each could be detached from
the other (leaving subject without properties, and the properties without a
subject).” ey may well not be separable; indeed most substratum theo-
rists claim that a substratum cannot exist on its own, failing to instantiate
any properties.24 But if an object is not identical to its modes (individually
23 Lowe (2000, 513, footnote 22) here provides a footnote worth relating (ibid.): “Martin does
clearly think that such a relation exists, even though he says that ‘e relation between
substrata and properties is not like other relations. . .because it stands between things about
or ingredients of objects and not between objects themselves’.”
24e main dissenter on this in the recent literature is (Sider 2006).
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or collectively) just what is it? What is there in addition to the modes sup-
posedly characterizing this thing, such that the modes are grounded? e
substratum theorist will argue that the primitive substance theorist, in trying
to answer this, will inevitably be driven to an admission of substrata.
To tie this back to our concernwith the unity problem: the primitive sub-
stance theorist can only solve that problem by reference to his/her substance
ontology if the object is real and irreducible to its modes, and ontologically
prior to them. But priority and irreducibility implies real distinction (even
if not separability).us the object is in some sense genuinely distinct from
its modes. And if that is the case, it is not immediately clear how primitive
substance theory can avoid falling into substratum theory; for if the object as
a whole, the object-qua-propertied, is not genuinely distinct from its modes
(clearly it is not, since it explicitly includes them), there must be something
about that object which is thus distinct, such that the relevant ontological
priority can be preserved. According to the substratum theorist, it is pre-
cisely the substratum that lls this role. Consequently, it is not immediately
clear how the primitive substance theorist’s solution to the unity problem
can avoid being reduced to the solution provided by substratum theorists:
namely, diverse inherently separable modes are conjoined because they all
belong to one and the same substratum.
At this stage of the dialectic, the proponent of Lowe’s viewmight counter
that theremust be something amisswith the substratum theorist’s solution to
the unity problem, since even if it can address that problem, it cannot address
the related unity problem alluded to towards the end of the previous section;
that is, it cannot address the issue of how it is that consistent property co-
instantiations are found across multiple objects. Lowe’s ontology of kinds
explains this, but how could substratum theory deal with it?
Martin (1980, 7) does in fact have something to say regarding the rela-
tionship between substrata and the ontology of kinds: “A substratum qua
substratum is that about an object that is the bearer of properties. . . . If a
set of properties is specied making up a kind and it is attributed to a sub-
stratum, then the resultant is an object that is an object of a kind. e sub-
stratum will be that about the object that is the bearer of properties. What
properties the substratum bears will not determine what the substratum is
qua substratum, but will determine what kind the object is.” Of course, this
does not shed much light on this 2nd unity problem, except to indicate that
Martin is open to a certain sort of realism about kinds. Clearly the view he is
thinking of is identity NKE rather than priority NKE, as he considers that a
set of properties makes up a kind. Still, priority NKE (with its realism about
universals) is not obviously inconsistent with substratum theory. In theory
then, one might hold to substratum theory, in part because of the solution it
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furnishes to the unity problem, while also holding to some form of priority
NKE (whether Lowe’s or Oderberg’s or some other version) to solve the 2nd
unity problem. As a matter of fact though, the one substratum theorist who
has taken up this question in detail, namely Armstrong (1997), rejects this
solution. He is a reductionist about natural kinds, and addresses the 2nd
unity problem not by reference to realism about kinds, but rather by refer-
ence to a robust nomic realism.us on his view diverse universals get uni-
ed in a single object because of their being co-instantiated in one and the
same substratum, while consistent property co-instantiations across objects
are explained by reference to contingent laws of nature that connect those
properties in just that way.25 Onemight of course dispute the ability of exter-
nal laws of nature to shed light on this, perhaps on the ground that external
governing laws are problematic in various ways.26 But what is important for
present purposes is simply that the substratum theorist has relevant options
available to him / her that do not necessarily require reference to something
like Lowe’s ontology of kinds.
With the objection having been laid out, and certain possible avenues of
reply rejected, I would like now to suggest an additional reply that may fare
better.
4. A Reply on Behalf of Lowe
e present diculty arises from Lowe’s commitment to the claim that both
objects andmodes (and correspondingly kinds and attributes) are genuinely
real, and to the claim that objects are ontologically prior to modes. Genuine
distinction and priority are needed to run Lowe’s solution to the unity prob-
lem, but it is genuine distinction and priority that also seem to push Lowe’s
ontology in the direction of substratum theory. One way around the ob-
jection then would be to arm the ontological priority of substance while
reconceiving modes (and attributes) in such a way that they are reducible,
in a sense, to the object (and kind).
At rst glance that suggestion is liable to seem radically antithetical to
Lowe’s system. Certainly the existing ontologies that adopt a comparable
suggestion are thus antithetical. I think here of austere nominalism, on the
25 Psillos (2009, 120) entertains a similar thought, seeming to reference laws as explaining
both unity problems: “. . .why is it the case that some causal powers go together and others
do not? Why do certain powers have a certain kind of ‘causal unity’. . . ? is is a crucial
question. . . the concurrence of certain powers might well be the consequence of a law. It
might well be that laws hold some capacities together. Hence, it seems that we cannot do
with just capacities. We also need laws as our building blocks.”
26 See especially (Mumford 2004) for a critique of robustly realist ontologies of law. See also
(Oderberg 2011, 90–92) on the specic question of whether such ontologies can be of any
help in addressing the unity problem.
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one hand, and Platonic relational substance ontology on the other. Loux
(2002, 98) summarizes austere nominalism as follows:
Since they deny that there are such things as attributes, the austere
nominalists see concrete particulars as unanalyzable entities, as things
that have no ontological structure. . . . As the austere nominalist sees
things, there is just the concrete particular. On this view, concrete
particulars are what David Armstrong appropriately calls ‘blobs’—
completely unstructured wholes.ey are, of course, things that can
have a plurality of distinct physical parts; but, for the austere nomi-
nalist, those physical parts are like the wholes whose parts they are in
being utterly opaque to metaphysical analysis.
e austere nominalist denies the reality not only of properties conceived
as universals, but even of tropes. Advocates of Platonic relational substance
ontology are realists about universals, thus diering in an important respect
from the austere nominalist. However, on their view these universals cannot
properly be said to be instantiated ‘in’ or ‘by’ individual objects.ey do not
in any sense enter into the constitution of the object. Rather, the object is
related to the utterly transcendent universal in some way, by ‘participation’
or ‘imitation’. In consequence of that relation the universals can be predi-
cated of the object, yet they remain radically separate. Lowe (2012, 233–234)
summarizes the Platonic view:
According to this approach, at least as I shall be interpreting it here,
features and forms do not reside within the concrete objects that are
said to ‘possess’ them, as constituents of those objects, but instead
exist ‘separately’ from the concrete world, serving as immutable and
eternal patterns for concrete objects to exemplify or imitate, usually—
or perhaps even always—only imperfectly. On this view, the concrete
objects themselves. . . are not ontologically complex, except inasmuch
as they contain other such objects as parts, and there is nothing ‘in’
them corresponding to the features and forms they are said to exem-
plify.ose features and forms are one and all universals, each being
exempliable, at least in principle, by a plurality of dierent concrete
objects. In saying that there is nothing ‘in’ the objects correspond-
ing to those features and forms, I mean to exclude the idea that those
objects possess particular features and forms, answering to or ‘resem-
bling’ the universal features and forms that they exemplify. . . . Con-
crete objects, on this view, are in themselves featureless and formless
‘blobs’, which can be described as ‘having’ certain features and forms
only in a derivative or relative sense, to the extent that they primitively
resemble to some degree some universal feature or form.
e similarity between the two views, despite their dierence concerning
the reality of universals, is made clear in that Loux and Lowe both employ
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the ‘blob’ analogy in their respective summaries. And Lowe’s system is op-
posed to both; its opposition to austere nominalism is obvious given Lowe’s
moderate (Aristotelian) realism. He also explicitly rejects the Platonic rela-
tional view (Lowe 2012, 234): “e troubles with the transcendent approach
are many, both metaphysical and epistemological, and I shall only scratch
the surface of these. First, it simply is not clear how an inherently feature-
less and formless ‘blob’—which is what a concrete object is, on the present
view—could ‘resemble’ some universal feature or form. For, in the nature
of the case, there could be nothing in virtue of which it could resemble one.”
us, while both austere nominalism andPlatonic relationism each solve the
unity problem by preventing it from ever getting o the ground (since on
both views objects do not have fundamental intrinsic properties), both are
inimical to Lowe’s four-category ontology. Consequently, one might think
that any proposal for the elimination or even reduction of modes to objects
(and attributes to kinds) would automatically fall afoul of that ontology’s
central commitments.
However, I think one sort of reductionist view might actually accord
with Lowe’s ontology. Rather than eliminating modes altogether (and, at the
level of universals, attributes), the idea I want to canvass is that modes be
reconceived. at is, a mode should be thought of not as a positive entity
borne by the object (which is how everyone from substratum theorists to
primitive substance theorists to bundle theorists typically conceives them),
but simply as the object itself qua limited / circumscribed / bounded in a de-
terminate fashion. Limitations are real in a sense—aphysical object has a de-
terminate spatial boundary. But that boundary is not a positive entity added
to the object or borne by the object; rather, it is just the object qua limited in
a certain way.is limitation thus properly counts as amode (it is, aer all, a
way that object is), yet it is not in any sense a positive addition to the object.
And in fact any geometrical / structural property seems capable of recon-
ceptualization in this manner. us think of an object’s determinate shape.
Does it make sense to think of shape as some extra, positive entity added to
the object? No.e object’s shape just is the object, the object qua bounded /
limited / circumscribed in a certain determinate fashion.e same goes for
size, length, breadth, and all the other paradigm structural properties.ey
are all modes, but modes properly conceived not as additions to the object
they characterize, but as reducible to that object qua limited in some way.
ey are limits on an object, or one might even say negations of the object.
ey are real and ineliminable, and needed as truthmakers for certain sorts
of true statements about the object, but they are real only in the manner in
which a doughnut hole is real, being merely a certain determinate absence
/ negation / circumscription of a concrete particular, and thus in a sense re-
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ducible to that particular. Note too that a limitation is not strictly identical
to what is being limited; a doughnut hole is not a doughnut. us Lowe’s
commitment o to the real distinction between a substance and its modes is
preserved.27
If someone were to arm that all intrinsic properties are geometrical /
structural in nature (a position which has certainly had its share of advo-
cates), then the objection discussed in the previous section would automat-
ically be seen to have no purchase. e reason is that now the ontological
priority of an object over its modes, and the real distinction between them,
in no way endangers primitive substance theory or its solution to the unity
problem. For it is clear how the object itself ‘grounds’ its modes, and does so
without any need to reference a distinct substratum: namely, it grounds its
modes in the sense that its modes just are the object qua negated in a certain
fashion. On this view, the unity of those modes becomes unproblematic; a
thing’s limitations / boundaries, even if somehow inherently separable, are
clearly unied by being limits of one and the same object.28 Moreover, be-
cause an object’s limits / boundaries etc. can change while the overall iden-
tity of the object is preserved, the contingency of at least some modes is
preserved.
Of course, Lowe does not believe only in geometrical / structural modes;
he arms the reality of dispositions as well. Consequently the reductionist
story I’m pushing here needs some further elaboration. How might a dis-
positional property be conceived as a determinate limitation / negation of
a substance? To begin answering this, we need to examine Lowe’s unique
conception of dispositions. For him, the dispositional / categorical distinc-
tion does not actually represent a distinction between two irreducible types
of property, but rather two types of predication (Lowe 2001, 8–10):
I have already indicated that I am opposed to drawing a distinction
between dispositional and categorical (or occurrent) properties, as
thoughwhat is at issue here is a distinction between types of property.
Rather, I want to distinguish between dispositional and (as I prefer to
27at being the case, ‘reduction’ is perhaps not the best term to use for the relationship being
discussed, since many (though certainly not all) take reduction to involve a strict identity
claim. Still, there seems a dearth of terms available to describe quite the relationshipmeant;
perhaps ‘reduction’ is as good as any other.
28 Something like this reductionism or deationism about modes (or at least certain sorts
of modes) has ample historical precedent in the middle ages (for instance Aquinas and
Ockham) and early modern period (for instance Hobbes). For detailed discussion see
(Pasnau 2011, especially chapters 10 and 14). A note of terminological caution though:
what Lowe means by ‘mode’, Pasnau means by ‘accident’. By contrast, ‘mode’ in Pasnau’s
work is a technical term for something quite dierent (i.e., something other than Lowe’s
modes).
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call it) occurrent predication. And, as I have already remarked, not
every predicate expresses a corresponding existent property.e dis-
tinction in question is exhibited in such pairs of sentences as ‘is
piece of rubber is stretchy’ and ‘is piece of rubber is stretching’, or
‘is stu dissolves inwater’ and ‘is stu is dissolving inwater’. Now,
my view is that, even when a predicate does express a real property, it
expresses one and the same property (in the sense of universal) irre-
spective of whether the predication involved is dispositional or occur-
rent in character. . . . Consider, then, properties of shape and colour,
whichmany philosophers regard as paradigm examples of categorical
and dispositional properties respectively. . . . I would urge that each of
the predicates ‘is square’ and ‘is red’ has both a dispositional and an
occurrent interpretation. us, I suggest, a surface which ‘is red’ in
the dispositional sense is one which, nevertheless, is not red, in the
occurrent sense, in a darkened room or under blue light: in those
circumstances, I suggest, the surface is grey or black in the occur-
rent sense. If we used verbs instead of adjectives to express colour, as
some languages do, this would be more obvious. We could then ren-
dermore explicit the distinction between occurrent and dispositional
senses of our ambiguous colour predicate ‘is red’ by saying that a sur-
face which is not redding under blue light may nonetheless be a reddy
surface—just as we say that a piece of rubber which is not stretching
may nonetheless be stretchy. Equally I think that a surface can be both
occurrently and dispositionally square—but, again, that this should
not be conceived as a distinction between dierent types of property
of the surface. For example, a rubber eraser may be ‘square’ in the
dispositional sense while also being ‘trapezoid’, say, in the occurrent
sense, when it is subjected to certain distorting stresses.
On Lowe’s perspective, occurrent predication thus involves the claim that
some object is characterized by a mode, whereas dispositional predication
involves the claim that some kind is characterized by an attribute. us to
say that an individual piece of salt is dissolving is to claim that a mode char-
acterizes it, whereas to say that salt is soluble is to claim that a kind is charac-
terized by an attribute, namely the attribute dissolving.e latter predication
is dispositional, the former occurrent. It is important to note here that for
Lowe, activities / processes / events belong to the category of modes (when
engaged in by particulars) and attributes (when engaged in by kinds). He
does not recognize a distinct, fundamental ontological category of process
or activity.29
How is this relevant to present concerns? Well, here again we have a
conception of modes whereby the mode is clearly not some addition to the
29 In this he diers from other natural-kind essentialists, like Ellis (2001, 2002, 2005), whose
six-category ontology includes (besides the four adopted by Lowe) individual processes
and process-universals.
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object or something literally borne by the object. at is not the sort of re-
lationship that an activity has to the entity engaged in that activity. Rather,
in this case the relevant mode is reducible to the object itself qua active or
(when dispositional predication is applied) qua instantiating an inherently
active kind. An individual object, even if currently inactive in some respect,
can be said to be disposed to some activity if the kind which it instantiates
is intrinsically engaged in that activity (in the abstract, atemporal fashion
appropriate to a universal).
us a kind is intrinsically active, and since an object just is the instanti-
ation of a kind, presumably for Lowe an object is also intrinsically active. But
of course an object typically cannotmanifest all of those activities character-
istic of its kind simultaneously, since some of those activities are liable to be
incompatible when considered in terms of temporal simultaneity. I as an in-
dividual object cannot carry out the activities ‘running’ and ‘making toast’ at
the same time, even though both activities are attributed to the kind ‘human
being’, and so apply to the object in the form of dispositional predications.
Consequently, what we normally think of as a dispositional property would
amount to an inherently active object whose activity is limited / circum-
scribed / determinately channeled by external causal factors, such that only
one or a limited number of activities characteristic of the kind it instantiates
are presently carried out by the object. From this perspective, the stimulus
of a disposition is reconceived as something that removes a barrier to the ob-
ject’s outwardly manifesting some intrinsic activity characteristic of its kind,
perhaps by preventing other incompatible activities from being carried out.
e stimulus does not bring to life an otherwise inert object—rather, it limits
/ channels activities it is already intrinsically engaged in.
For instance, consider fragility (hardly a fundamental disposition, but
widely used in thought experiments concerning dispositions). An object’s
breaking apartmight be conceived as the stimulation of a power-for-breaking
in a previously inert object. But it might likewise be reconceived as the in-
terruption / limitation / circumscription of the bonding activity being car-
ried out by the object (or the object’s proper parts), which limitation results
in breaking and also entails that certain other incompatible activities (such
as dissolving) are not being carried out at that same time. Or consider my
power to run and my power to stand still. Both ‘running’ and ‘standing still’
are attributes of the kind ‘human being’. But when that kind is instantiated
as an object, it is not the case that both activities can be carried out simul-
taneously.us there must be some external causal factor that channels the
inherent activities of the object in such a way that only one of those activ-
ities (or some other activity) is realized at a time, a factor that explains the
determinate limitation of activities manifested by that object. Again, on this
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view, the stimulus that results in what we normally think of as a disposition-
manifestation is a causal factor that limits / circumscribes / channels intrin-
sic activities in some way—the stimulus is not a causal factor that prompts
activity in an otherwise inert object.
is way of looking at dispositions is rather a radical departure from typ-
ical dispositionalist thinking; certainly, it is usually assumed that activities
are grounded in ontologically prior causal powers, not the other way around.
But Lowe’s ontology of dispositions is itself already a radical departure from
the standard dispositionalist line, so at worst the present suggestion just ren-
ders his ontology a bitmore radical. And the situation is arguably helped by
the fact that there are good, wholly independent reasons for thinking that
at least some activities are intrinsic to an object, that not all activities are
grounded in dispositions. Dumsday (2012) makes a case for this, thereby
lending some additional background support to Lowe’s ontology of disposi-
tions and the additional reconceptualization suggested here.
If this proposal is at all workable, such that all modes are considered re-
ducible either to objects qua determinately limited (in the case of geometri-
cal / structural modes) or to objects qua intrinsically active and instantiating
intrinsically active kinds (in the case of dispositions), it would furnish the
primitive substance theorist with ammunition against the charge of being
pushed into substratum theory. For now the object is explicitly conceived
as related to its modes not as a pincushion is to its pins but more as a hunk
of marble to the shape that now constitutes it as the specic statue it is, pre-
cisely by constituting a boundary / determinate limitation on the marble.30
An object is conceived as having modes, but not in any way that we would
be tempted to think of the substance as having some underlying, bare con-
stituent like a substratum.
Furthermore, if this proposal is workable it may also shed some light on
how to respond to Heil’s (2012, 115–116) critique of Lowe on dispositions:
Consider this electron, e. Let us suppose that electrons annihilate
when they encounter a positron. So e is disposed to annihilate on
encountering a positron. is will be the case, even if e never en-
counters a positron. But now the electron kind is supposed to possess
the property of annihilating in concert with a positron. It, the kind,
30 Scholastic readers will likely perceive a parallel between this proposal and the view (de-
fended by so-called ‘existential’omists like Clarke 2001) of essence as determinate limit
on existence. I would be inclined to think that ultimately one might have to transition
from parallel to equivalence, insofar as substance is understood most fundamentally as an
independent existent. Demonstrating that equivalence would require some work though.
Such a proposal would also involve an armation of the ontological priority of existence
over essence, an idea Lowe resists in (Lowe 2008, 40).
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doesn’t possess this property dispositionally; we are oering an expla-
nation of dispositionality. So the electron kind is annihilating. Well
and good, but it is also repelling other electrons and doing much else
besides. the picture here is of the kind as being God-like: wholly ‘in
act’. A kind is doing all its instances could do. As the electron exam-
ple suggests, one reason this might be hard to swallow is that some
of what an instance of a kind would do apparently exclude its doing
other things. An electron would repel other electrons. Presumably,
then, the electron kind is ‘characterized by’ repelling electrons. But
an electron would annihilate were it to encounter a positron. So the
kind electron, in addition to repelling other electrons, is annihilating.
I don’t want to say that this picture is impossible, but I admit I do not
understand it. I do not see how a kind could be, timelessly perhaps,
characterized by apparently incompatible properties.
e force of this objection ismuted when one simply admits that kinds, con-
sidered as universals, are atemporal entities that in fact admit of incompat-
ible activity-predications. Objects, the instantiations of those kinds, inherit
their intrinsic activities, but they do so in such a way that their activities
are bounded / limited / circumscribed and incompatible activities are not
carried out by the same object simultaneously.
If geometrical / structural properties and dispositions are the only two
irreducible categories of modes / attributes, then notmuchmore needs to be
said. But what of qualitative properties? Well, the paradigm case of a qual-
itative property is colour, and it is widely assumed that colour is reducible
to a disposition or set of dispositions (a power to reect light in a certain
way combined with a power of some organism’s visual system to register this
etc.). If all qualitative properties are thus reducible to dispositions, and dis-
positions can be handled in the manner suggested above, then there will be
no diculty here. For reasons of space I cannot at presentmake the case that
all qualitative properties are in fact reducible to dispositions, but of course
such arguments have been made.
5. Conclusion
It may be that the position just developed in reply to the objection made in
section 3 above is not the onlyway to address that objection, nor the onlyway
for a primitive substance theorist and natural-kind essentialist to address it.
Earlier I referenced the work of Oderberg and other Scholastics; arguably
their conception of kinds as substantial forms allows for a dierent reply to
the objection, one that does not risk falling into substratum theory and does
not automatically necessitate the reductionist strategy I have just outlined.
However, as we have seen, the Scholastic account of the unity problem does
involve some reference to prime matter, which, while importantly dierent
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from the notion of a substratum,31 is analogous in some ways and liable to
be resisted by primitive substance theorists like Lowe. In fact Lowe explicitly
rejects prime matter in (Lowe 1998) and (Lowe 2013). At any rate, another
useful item for future research would be a detailed compare / contrast study
between the approach to the unity problem taken by Lowe and that taken by
one or more of the mainstream Scholastic systems, and a comparison of the
distinct problems faced by those diering approaches.
To sumup: the unity problem is a longstanding one that has played a role
in shaping both substance ontology and natural-kind essentialism. Lowe’s
solution to that problemdeserves close attention; and though it is apparently
vulnerable to an objection arising out of the substratum theorists’ camp, that
objection may admit of a reply that accords with Lowe’s system, even if in-
volving a reconceptualization of the nature of modes as determinate limita-
tions (whether of structure or activity). And if that reconceptualization is
adopted, there may be a fringe benet insofar as it could shed light on how
to address a dierent concern raised for Lowe’s system by Heil (2012).
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